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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UT~.f I L E D 
EARL D. TANNER, 19.57 
Plailntiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
-----~---~---~----~ . 
Clerk, Suprem~-c~~;;t~·t:l~~~;_---~. 
W. C. LAWLER and LAURA M. 
LAWLER, his wife, 
Defendant .and Appellants. 
.. .. vs. 
WALTER H. REICHERT, 
Defendant and Cownterclaimant as 
to Earl D. Tanner, arna Plaintiff 
· against George Beckstead as Sheriff. 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
GEORGE BECKSTEAD, as Sheriff 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Defendant in Intervention and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 8518 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANTS' 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
EARL D. TANNER 
Attorney for Respondent 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EARL D. TANNER, 
Plailntiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
W. C. LAWLER and LAURA M. 
LAWLER, his wife, 
Defendant and Appellants. 
vs. 
WALTER H. REICHERT, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant as Case No. 8518 
to Earl D. Tanner, arnd Plaintiff 
against George Beckstead as Sheriff 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, and 
A p,pellant, 
vs. 
GEORGE .BECKSTEAD, as Sheriff 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Defendant in Intervention and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANTS' 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In appellant's brief in support of their petition for 
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rehearing they haye raised.seven points of alleged ·error. 
It is the position of the _respondents that as to all of the 
points raised in said p.et.itiop., save and except a portion 
of Point One and)?oint )rive~ the matters presented are-
those which wer~ argue~ in the briefs heretofore .filed 
and require no f11rther discussion other than· a referen~,e. 
to the arg·uments _set for~h -by these. resp~ndents in the· 
Respondents Brief her.etofore filed herein~ The portion 
of Point One :Qf.: appellant's ... said brief to whieh thi~. 
ans,vering brief is addressed re.ads ' ' The court erred .i.n 
stating that the appellants have furnished a. stay bond 
on the appeal, * * *" and the said Point Five reads as 
follows ''The c~urt erred in holding that the appellants 
gave a s·tay bond ~n order to retain. 'possession of the 
property here ·involved.". . . ... : 
~ehe pertinent facts are these : . On March 26,. 1956, 
appellants filed the.~r no'tice qf_ appeal fron1 the judgrnent 
belov1 (R. 93). ·The operative .. po.rtiotl of said.r:totice reads 
as follows: 
''You and ea·ch of you will take· notice that 
W. C. Lawler· and Laura ·M. Lawler, ·his wife, 
defendants above named, and Walter H. R~iche·r.t 
defendant and counterclaimant as to Earl D.· 
Tanner ·and plaintiff against George~ Beckstead, 
as Sheriff of Salt Lake County., Utah,. above 
named, hereby appeal .to .the Supreme c·9urt of 
the State of Utah from a judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff, Earl D. Tanner and defendant in 
intervention, George Beckstead as Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, which judgment was entered 
in this action · o nthe .17th day . of March, 1956. 
This appeal is ·t-aken from. the whole of said judg.-
ment." (Italics added.) 
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On the same day and, presumably, at the same time, 
two bonds were filed by appellants. The first of said 
bonds was denominated a ''Cost Bond on Appeal,'' was 
in the amount of $300.00 and wa.s filed on behalf of all 
three appellants, Walter H. Reichert, W. C. Lawler and 
Laura M. ·Lawler. The second bond was denominated 
''Supersedeas Bond on Appeal.'' Both bonds were sub-
mitted to the trial court and were approved by Judge 
David T. Lewis in an ex parte examination of said bonds. 
A notation of approval is found in the upper left-hand 
corner of each bond (R. 96 and 98). Said Supersedeas 
Bond reads as follows : 
"KNOW ALL }fEN BY THESE PRES-
ENTS, that we, Julius C. Reichert and Sylvia 
Reichert, both of Salt Lake City, Utah, are held 
and firmly bound unto EARL D. TANNER in the 
sum of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,-
000.00), to ·be p·aid unto the said EARL D. TAN-
NER, his executors, administrators or assigns, 
to which payment \vell and truly to be made we 
bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and admini-
strators firmly by these presents. 
"WITNESS our hands this 24th day of 
Mar·ch, 1956. 
''The condition of the above obligation is such 
that whereas on the 17th day of M-arch, 1956, a 
judgment in the sutn of $500.00 and costs was 
rendered against Walter Reichert and in favor of 
Ear 1 D. T-anner in a certa.in action in the Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, which 
aetion is nu1nbered 107508 and entitled, ·Earl D. 
'fanner, Plaintiff, vs. \\r. C. La"rler, Laura M. 
I.Jawler, his wife, Defendants, vs. '':alter H. Reich-
ert, Defendant and Countere.Ian1ant a.s to Earl D. 
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Tanner and Plaintiff ~against George Beckstead, 
as Sheriff of Salt I..~ake County, Utah, vs. George 
Beckstead, as Sheriff of Salt Lake County Utah, 
Defendant in Intervention~ and 
''WHEREAS, the said Walter Reichert is 
about to appeal to the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah from the judgment so rendered against 
him; and 
"WHEREAS, the said Walter H. Reichert 
desires to stay execution upon said judgment 
pending the appeal; 
''N,OW, THEREFORE, if the said judgment 
is affirmed or the appeal dismissed, then and in 
such ~case the said Walter H. Reichert will pay 
in full the amount of said judgment and costs, 
interest and damages for delay, then and in such 
case this undertaking shall become null and void, 
otherwise to remain in full force and effect. 
''The undersigned hereby submit himself and 
herself to the jurisdiction of the Third District 
Court of Salt Lake County and irrevocably ap-
point the Clerk of the Court as his and her agent 
upon whom any papers affecting his or her 
liability may be enfor.ced on motion without the 
necessity of an independent action.'' 
At all times during the course of this .appeal Elias 
Hansen has been the attorney, and the sole attorney, 
for ail three of the appellants. 
The following statements, though true, do not appeae 
in the re·cord of this action. Since th~y Bear· on the sub-
ject of this brief and there has been no 'bccasion for set-
ting them forth heretofore, it is the view of respondents 
that these allegations should be placed before this c'Ourt 
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in order to aid in its interpretation. If the court feels 
that they are of no significance, even if assumed to be 
true, it will not be necessary to have them examined by 
a trier of facts. If, on the other hand, this court deems 
them to be of significance, if true, an examination of 
their verity by a trier of facts may be in order. 
At or about the time of the filing of the aforemen-
tioned notice of appeal and bonds, plaintiff telephoned 
the attorney for the three appellants and requested that 
some mutually agreeable arrangements be made for the 
restitution of the premises to his possession in compli-
ance with the judgment as to which said attorney had 
indicated an intent so to appeal. Said attorney advised 
the pl~aintiff that in no event would arrangements be 
made to restore said property to his possession or to pro-
vide that the rentals being paid under contract to the ap-
pellant Reichert by the appellant Lawlers be paid, during 
the course of said proposed appeal, to plaintiff rather 
than Reichert. Said attorney advised plaintiff that he 
was not entitled to possession during the appeal period, 
and, were he to atteu1pt to secure possession during that 
period it would be \vrongful and he would be· required 
to defend an action for a very substantial sun1 of n1oney 
for dispossessing ap·pellants. 
I11 light of this threat and of appellants fir1n state-
nlent that possession \Vas to be 1naintained during the 
appeal period, the plaintiff, upon receipt of notice of 
appeal, exanlined the two bonds filed herein and, in an 
ex partp eon l'PreneP~ askPd the trial court~ 'vhich had 
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approved said bonds in an ex parte conference with appel-
lants' counsel, whether it was the intent of the court 
when it approved said bond, that the supersedeas bond 
operate to stay the whole of the judgment appealed 
from by Reichert. Plaintiff was advised that that ~vas the 
understanding of the s.aid court "rhen it approved said 
bond. Plaintiff then advised the court that, in view of the 
representations made to p}aintiff by counsel for appellant 
Reichert as to s-aid _appellant's s.ubstantial financial 
capacity and in· view of the fact that the $9,078.81 paid 
to the sheriff for· said appellant was held by the sheriff 
and refused by said appellant and would be so ·held 
pending the appeal, plaintiff waived any objection to 
the amount of the supersedeas bond. 
Respondent Tanner made no further effort to secure 
the possession of said premises and ha.s been out of their 
possession up to and including the :present time. During 
a portion of the period of the appeal, respondents Law-
lers have been in possession of the. premises as tenants 
of respondent Reichert under a written contract requir-
ing them to pay the said Reichert rentals of $75.00 per 
n1onth. Respondent T.anner believes and alleges that 
appellants I.Javvlers have continued after the expiration 
of said written rental agreement to :possess said premises 
as the tenants of said appellant Reichert. Whether 
rentals have been paid from the ]~awlers to Reichert 
under this arrangement has not yet been determined by 
any court. 
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It was stipulated between the parties here (R. 62) 
that appellant Reichert was the person in possession of 
the disputed premises and that he maintained his pos-
session through the appellants Lawlers. This was found 
to be the fact and judgment was rendered accordingly. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN STATING THAT REICH-
ERT HAS DEP·OSITED A STAY BOND IN ORDER FOR 
THE LAWLERS TO RETAIN PO·SSE.SSION OF THE PROP-
ERTY PENDING THE APPEAL. 
ARGU~IENT 
This court, with a ·clear insight into the actual results 
of the facts shown by the record, made the follo,ving 
statement under Point ( 4) of the majority opinion: 
"Here it is evident that the money judgment 
against the Lawlers is not collectable. There are 
liens for more than $7,000.00 .against any interest 
they may have in real property in this county and 
the mortgage foreclosure judgment was allowed to 
go to sale. R-eichert has deposited a stay ·bond 
in order for the Lawlers to retain possession of 
the property pending the appeal but no such bond 
'vas deposited for the La"Tlers. If a money judg-
ment is awarded only against the La-w"lers then 
Reichert's stay bond will have the effect of pre-
venting Tanner fro1n obtaining possession of the 
property pending this appeal but he will be unable 
to .collect from such bond the judgment against 
Lawlers, although as Reichert's tenants the Law-
lers may voluntarily· pay him the rental value of 
the property during that. tin1e. '' 
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Since Reichert was maintaining his possession of the 
disputed premises through tenants who were, for this 
purpose, actually tenant-agents, a dispossession of the 
Lawlers would have been a dispossession of Reichert. 
If the supersedeas bond is to be held to have the effect 
which it has been accorded by the conduct of all of the 
parties to this action, to-wit, a stay of restitution, a dis-
possession of Reichert by the dispossession of his tenant-
agents, would have been wrongful and would have sub-
jected both the sheriff and Tanner to damages. That 
Reichert so interpreted the situation is clear from his 
conduct and warning. 
The body of the supersedeas bond contains ina-ccur-
acies and ambiguities. Given one construction, the opera-
tive portion of said bond would have the effect of staying 
enfor·cement of such portion of the judgment as was 
being appealed from, and, given a different interpreta-
tion, would stay only the money judgment. The burden 
of that uncertainty must be borne by the party furnish-
ing the bond for approval and acting under the bond to 
retain possession of the premises for the whole period 
of the appeal. Approval of the bond supe~rseded and 
set at naught the whole of the judgment against Reichert. 
The question now before this court is whether it can be 
held, in light of the facts of the case that the ''super-
sedeas ·bond'' furnished as such and so denominated by 
appellant Reichert, viewed in light of the surrounding 
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circumstanees and his continued possession of the pre-
mises, can be said not to have been dep·osited in order 
to keep Tanner from the possession of the premises and 
can he held not to have kept Tanner from said possession. 
Rule 73 (d) U. R. C. P. p:rovides for the furnishing of 
a supersedeas bond. This rule must be read in conjunC-
tion with the provisions of Rule 62 U. R. C. P .. Said Rule 
73 ( d) is verba tim with Rule 73 (d) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure except for the use of the word 
"sheriff" in p·1ace of the word "marshal." It provides 
as follows: 
''SUPERSEDEAS BOND. Whenever an ap-
pellant entitled thereto desires a stay on appeal, 
he may present to the court for its approval a 
supersedeas bond "~hich shall have such surety 
or sureties as the court requires. The bond shall 
be conditioned for the satisfaction of the judg-
lnent in full together with .c-osts, interest, and dam-
ages f.or delay, if for any reason the appeal is 
dismissed or if the judgn1ent is affirmed, and 
to satisfy in full such modification of the judg-
Inent and su.ch costs, interest, and damages as the 
appellate court 1nay adjudge and a''yard. \\~hen 
the judgn1ent is for the recovery of money not 
other,;rise secured, the an1ount of the bond shall 
be fixed at such smn as will cover the "'.,.hole 
antount of the judg1nent remaining unsatisfied, 
costs on the appeal, interest, and damages for de-
lay, unless the court after notice and hearing and 
for good {~ause show,.n fixes _a. different a1nount 
or orders secutity other than the bond. \Y.hen 
the judgn1ent deter1nines the disposition of thr 
property in controver8y as in real actions, re-
plevin, and actions to foreclose mortgag~es or when 
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such property is in the custody of the sheriff or 
when the proceeds of such property or a bond for 
its value is in the custody or ·Control of the court, 
the amount of the supersedeas bond shall be fixed 
at such sum only a.s will secure the amount re-
covered for the use and detention of the property, 
the costs of the action, costs on appeal, interest, 
and damages for delay.'' 
The effect of a supersedeas bond in the state of 
Utah has been settled by this court in the case of 
Smith vs. Kimball, 70 A.L.R. 101, 76 U. 350, 289 P. 588, 
which holds as follows : 
''The judgment in the main action, from 
which the appeal was taken and which was super-
seded, was, in legal effect by the appeal and super-
sedeas, vacated and rendered inoperative, the au-
thority of the court below terminated and pre-
vented from further proceeding with respect to 
any matter involved in the subject-matter of the 
appeal, or to take any action which amounted to 
an execution or enforcement of the judgment, ·or 
which affect~d the subject-matter of the appeal, 
and the case left with all its incidents precisely 
as it stood before the rendition of the judgment 
in the court below and became one of cognizan,ce 
in this court on a trial de novo on the record; 
and, though the judgment in the district court was 
final judgment for purposes of the appeal, yet, 
because of the appeal and the supersedeas, was 
not a final determination of the rights of the 
parties in and to the subject-matter of the litiga-
tion, until a determination by this court." (Citing 
statute and cases.) 
In that case, however, the court stated that "Neither 
the form or the sufficiency of the supersedeas to operate 
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as a full and ·complete stay is qu,estion·ed. '' For this 
reas1on said case cannot be held to be determinative of 
the issues in the present case, but the rule as to the effect 
of the supersedeas is important. 
As is set forth in Volume 7, Moore's F.ederal Prac-
tice, 2nd edition at Page 1370, in a discussion of Rule 
62 (d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which is the 
same as Rule 62 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure), it is ·pointed out that the stay is effective when the 
superse.de.as bond is app'roved by the court and that 
execution issued thereafter is wholly irregular and may 
be quashed either in the court below or by the court of 
review. Four opinions of the United States Supreme 
Court are cited by Moore to this effect. Since it is not 
anticipated that thi~ proposition is controverted, said 
citations will not be repeated here. 
The supersedeas bond filed herein is composed of 
two parts, the recitals and the operative portion. The 
first recital refers to the judgment ''rendered against 
Walter Reichert and in favor of Earl D. Tanner in a 
certain action in the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
(jounty, lTtah which action is numbered 107508 and en-
titled 'Earl D. Tanner, plaintiff, Ys W. C. La"rler, Laura 
M. I.Ja~rler, his ~rife, defendants, vs. "\"\.,..alter H. Reichert, 
defendant and counterelai1nant as to Earl D. Tan-
ner * * *.' '' It characterizes said judgment as being a 
jndgn1e11t in the sum of $500.00 and costs. This character-
ization ifi in error for the rea$on that the judgment 
there rei'Prred to (a11d appealed fron1), is a judgment 
in the ~urn of $500.00 and co~ts and restit11tion. 
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The next recital states that the said Walter H. Reich-
ert is about to appeal to the Supreme Court of th·e 
State of Utah from· the judgment so rendered against 
him and the next recital states that said Walter H. 
Reichert desires to stay execution upon said judgment 
pending the appeal. The judgment referred to, appealed 
from, and stayed, is the judgment for restitution as well 
as damages. 
The operative portion of said supersedeas bond 
reads as follows : 
"Now, therefore, if the said judgment is 
affirmed or the appeal dismissed, then and in such 
case the said Walter H. Reichert will pay in full 
the amount of said judgment and costs, interest 
and damages for delay, then and in such case this 
undertaking shall ·become null and void, otherwise 
to remain in full force and effect.'' 
It is the contention of the respondent Tanner that 
the operative portion of said supersedeas bond controls, 
and when approved, stays the whole judgrnent app.ealed 
from, was understood by all partie·s to this action to he 
controlling, was treated and acted upon by all parties 
as controlling, and as having the effect of staying the 
entire judgment insofar as Reichert was concerned. Had 
Reichert intended to stay only the money judgment he 
eould easily have said in the bond ''only the money 
judgment is to be stayed." 
The essential elements of an effective supersedeas 
bond are set forth in Moore's Federal Practice, 2nd 
Edition, Volume 7 at Page 3175 as follows: 
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''A supersedeas bond must be ·conditioned (1) 
for the satisfaction of the judgment in full to-; 
gether with costs, (2). interest and·. (3) damages 
for delay, if for any. reason the aprpeaJ is d1s-· 
mis:sed or if the judgmentis affirmed, and {4)to~­
satisfy in full such modification of the judgment 
and such costs, interest, and dawages as the appel-
lant court niay adjudge and aw:ard." 
It is apparent from the operative portion of the 
supersedeas bond se( forth above that these conditions 
were fully met, and~- th.at the judgment against Reichert 
was thereafter, as a matter .of law, superseded and en-
forcement stayed. 
It was \Vi thin the po,ver of the appellailt Reichert to . 
clearly state that the judgn1ent conce~p.ed in the super~- · 
sedeas bond was the money .judgn1ent only, if t~at was· 
his intent, and not to ·furnish a bond which, from ·the 
. ' . . ·~ . 
operative portion of it, ronstrued togethe-r "'ith the 
notice of appeal, would appear to b~·ing into operation · 
the legal effect set forth in S·ntith VS.,.Kinlba-l!, supra, as 
to the ""rhole ·of -'the .judg1nent ·against Re~c~1ert. 
It has bern argued tliat. ·t.he amount of the bond is 
of so1ne signifi.c~anee. If this regard it shoul-Q. be noted 
that a $300.00 bond \va~ filed and that the -supersedea~ 
bond, being· in addition to the cost bond, \Vas in .an a1nount 
\vhieh could, in vie'v of the aceelerated a•ppeal provision3 
in thi~ kind of Ca8e, be expected to_ COYer damages 011 
appeal in event treble da1nages 'vere disallowed.· In addi-
tion it 1nust be considered that the smn of $9,078.81 was 
still on dPposit \vith th(l sheriff and subject to being used 
to satiRfy any judp;n1ent ag~ainst the appellant Reichert 
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herein. The waiver by the respondent Tanner of a chal-
lenge to the sufficiency of the amo111nt of the bond should 
not be held to constitute a waiver as to the sufficiency 
of its effect. That he construed the bond to have the 
effect of staying restitution cannot be doubted, for he 
made no further effort to obtain restitution of the pre-
mises after the telephone conversation with respondant.s' 
counsel, the bond, and the ex parte discussion with the 
court which had approved the bond ex parte. 
In the event this court feels that said bond did not 
have the effect of staying proces-s to obtain possession 
of the premises by a writ of restitution, it must inquire 
whether the a;ppellant R.eichert has waived or is estopped 
from claiming that the bond has limited application. 
Presumably these determinations would require an addi-
tional hearing. Such a hearing could establish whether 
the Lawlers have paid rent to Reichert during the period 
of appeal or during any portion of said period, and 
could fix damages for withholding possession from Tan-
ner both as to loss of use and as to property damage. 
If it be held that said bond did not stay Tanner from 
repossession of the premises during the appeal, said 
additional hearing could provide for a determination 
as to who is obligated to pay the fair value of the use 
of the premises during the period of the appeal. Cer-
tainly, under the circumstances of this case, Tanner 
should not in any event be wholly deprived of the value 
of the use of the premises during the period of the 
appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above the respondents 
respectfully urge this court to deny the p,etition for 
re'hearing filed hereby by the appellants. The original 
desision of this court as reported is accurate, just, and 
proper in ·each and every respect. 
Resp~ectfully submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER 
Attorney for Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
